University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law
2006

Introduction
Anita L. Allen
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Animal Law Commons, and the Philosophy Commons

Repository Citation
Allen, Anita L., "Introduction" (2006). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 1298.
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1298

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.

INTRODUCTION

ANITA L. ALLEN -CASTELLITTO*

Where do non-human animals fit into the moral universe? They are not
proper moral agents, rational persons held morally responsible for their
conduct. But they are proper moral patients. They are sentient creatures
capable of suffering, whose well-being is increasingly in human hands, and
whose treatment by humans reflects deeply on human character and ethical
values.
Given animals' ethical significance, what role should the law have in
fostering animal welfare-or for that matter, animal rights or animal
liberation? To what extent should our relationships with animals as sources
of food, drugs, clothing, furniture, entertainment, companionship, work and
research subjects be regulated by state and federal law?
The University of Pennsylvania is an apt institution to sponsor a journal
devoted to these important questions of policy and morals, for it has had to
confront concerns about the well-being of animals the hard way.

Twenty

years ago, Penn was the scene of controversial experiments on primates.
Investigating the potentially tragic outcomes for humans affected by head
injuries, Penn researchers deliberately subjected unanesthetized primates to
skull trauma.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) labeled the Penn
primate experiments inhumane. PETA activists broke into a campus lab and
stole a videotape of the experiments. The graphic videotape was televised
and, as a result, the University's Head Injury Center lost favor with the
public and federal funding. Penn quickly stopped testing on primates and
set up an institutional review board to monitor all subsequent animal
research.
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Head Injury Center adheres to "the highest standards of animal welfare. "1
The University of Pennsylvania Law School is proud to welcome the
inaugural volume of the Journal of Animal Law and Ethics.

A diverse

group of distinguished and emerging scholars have contributed to this
exciting first volume.
In his Article, noted animal rights theorist and lawyer Professor Gary
Francione of Rutgers University School of Law-Newark takes up the core
question of membership in the moral community. He argues that sentience
alone, rather than human-like cognitive capacities, is sufficient for full
membership in the moral community. The animal welfare movement, he
argues, has failed to recognize this.
But what is "animal welfare," really? The practical meaning of "animal
welfare" is explored in an

essay by Dr.

Robert Gamer,

a political

philosopher from the University of Leicester in Great Britain.

He argues

that to speak of "animal welfare" is to strike a compromise between
according animals the full moral standing of human beings and according
them no moral standing at all.

While the middle way Dr. Gamer defends

may not pass ideal philosophical muster, he believes it is a useful political
stance for securing policies that protect animals from the most wanton,
egregious harms in a world of die-hard speciesists.
Taking off from the premises that higher animals are indeed part of the
moral community and that animal welfare policies are necessary, Professor
Ani Satz of Emory Law School boldly argues for a conception of animal
welfare that is close to what Mr. Garner might consider an impractically
radical call for animal rights.

Professor Satz urges a "nondiscrimination

paradigm for animal welfare similar to the paradigms applied to other
oppressed groups, including the disabled."

When deciding how to treat

animals, like monkeys, sheep, cows or pigs, she contends that policy-makers
should think about whether they have good reasons to treat animals
differently from humans with similar characteristics.
Further pursuing the meaning of animal welfare, University of Arizona
Law Professor Darian M. Ibrahim attacks anticruelty statutes as inadequate
and ineffective protectors of animals.

The problem, he argues, is that

anticruelty statutes call for humane treatment, but do not prevent people
from exploiting animals. We are still allowed to commercially farm animals
for food industries, hunt for sport, and use animals in research. All of this is
exploitation, Ibrahim believes, that by its very nature requires tremendous
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suffering and makes humane treatment impossible.

Until the law moves

beyond the "humane exploitation" paradigm, animals will be mistreated.
And animals may be mistreated, even when they are prized exhibits at
zoos and zoological parks around the world. In his Article, Aaron Komfield
tells the story of the unhappy fate of elephants at the San Francisco Zoo,
who died because their artificial habitat was woefully inadequate to their
needs. Kornfield concludes that the day of the zoo as a place to see "exotic
animals" has come and gone: we should know better. Rather than attempt
to maintain animals out of their natural habit in foreign lands in accordance
with harmfully utilitarian zoo accreditation standards, zoos would do better,
he argues, to offer the public a close look at regionally indigenous species
for which they could adequately care.
Collette L. Adkins Giese shows that nonhuman primates, like the
elephants Kornfield describes, are often poorly cared for by their caretakers
and are ill-served by existing animal welfare laws governing research. Even
provisions of the Animal Welfare Act enacted in the wake of
disclosures

of

Penn's head-injury

Laboratory Animals Act of

research,

"Improved

PETA's

Standards

1985," fall short, she argues.

for

Mounting

evidence of the true psychological needs of highly intelligent chimpanzees
and other nonhuman primates renders current standards for caring for
captive apes, chimps and monkeys obsolete.
If animal welfare doesn't grab you, what about human welfare?

How

does it feel to spend your workday killing chickens or harvesting duck
livers? How does it feel to have someone maliciously kill your pet?
UCLA Law Professor Taimie Bryant assesses the impact on food
industry workers of witnessing and participating in violence against animals
destined for the dinner table. Convinced that animal slaughter threatens the
psychological health and moral
Professor

Bryant

forcefully

well-being

argues

for

of humans

what

she

calls

exposed to it,
"collaborative

advocacy" between animal welfare and human welfare advocates.
Professor William A. Reppy, Jr. of Duke Law School addresses a legal
issue that goes to the heart of the human-animal companion relationship:
whether a person who intentionally kills another's pet should be liable for
both the market value of the pet and for punitive damages for the emotional
pain and suffering caused to the pet's owner. Reppy looks at recent case
law to address the competing tendencies to treat animals like mere property
or as companions whose loss can lead to grief and pain the law ought to
recogmze.
Together, the Articles and Comment in this volume provide readers a
vivid, stimulating introduction to the ethics and law of animals.

I look
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forward to what future issues will bring.
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All of the contributors to this

volume share a strong belief that animals merit special protection. There are
no articles by avid hunters, researchers dependent upon animal subjects, or
chicken producers. The friendly consensus of volume one must inevitably
yield to debates and disagreements among contributors of radically different
viewpoints in future volumes. The world is indeed divided between people
who see no harm in using animals to serve human ends and those who
would protect them as fellow travelers.
scholarly airing of all sides.

This journal is committed to a

